The End Game in Iran: Four Ways the Crisis May Resolve

[Warph]

The End Game in Iran: Four Ways the Crisis May Resolve
By TONY KARON - Time Mag.

One: Revolution 2.0?
Despite the Twitter-enabled street scenes and revived slogans of Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1979 revolution, a repeat of that successful insurrection remains highly improbable. For one thing, the protest movement is being led by a faction of the Islamic Republic's political establishment, whose members stand to lose a great deal if the regime is brought down and, thus, have to calibrate their dissent. More important, an unarmed popular movement can topple an authoritarian regime only if the security forces switch sides or stay neutral. But Iran's key security forces - the Élite Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Basij militia - are bastions of support for Ahmadinejad. And they have hardly used a fraction of their repressive power. Also, while the opposition draws far larger crowds, there are still millions of Iranians strongly backing Ahmadinejad. So even if the government is unable to destroy the opposition, it's unlikely that the opposition will be in a position to destroy the government.
(See pictures of the enduring influence of Ayatullah Khomeini)
http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1904208,00.html


Two: A Tehran Tiananmen?
The harsh language used by Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards to describe opposition protests - and their invoking of the specter of an Eastern European–style "velvet revolution" backed by the West - appeared to be generating a narrative that would justify a bloody crackdown, a massive use of military force that would terrify the opposition into submission. Clearly, the limited violence unleashed by the Ahmadinejad camp thus far has failed to intimidate Mousavi and his supporters. But while it would almost certainly clear the streets, the "nuclear option" of a Tiananmen Square–style crackdown would be a potentially fatal wound to the regime's own sources of legitimacy - its limited but lively democracy and the backing of Shi'ite clergy. Discord among the mullahs is growing, with some senior clerics like the esteemed house-arrested dissident Ayatullah Hossein-Ali Montazeri publicly condemning Khamenei's handling of the election and warning ordinary soldiers and police officers that they would "answer to God" for any violence against the people. A crackdown would risk reducing a regime built on clerical authority and "managed" democracy to a tyranny on par with the Shah. Khamenei will be reluctant to go that route. But his handling of the political crisis thus far will have deepened long-standing skepticism within the clergy about his abilities as Supreme Leader. A harsh crackdown, even if followed by reforms, would solve an immediate crisis, but at the cost of inflicting a possibly fatal long-term wound on the regime.


Three: Khamenei's "Divine" Retreat?
Khamenei blundered when he yoked his own position as Supreme Leader - which is typically above the factional fray of the regime's politics - so closely to Ahmadinejad. He issued a barely disguised public endorsement of the candidate, and then rushed to proclaim Ahmadinejad's "divine victory" and order all Iranians to accept it. But the mounting instability on the streets appears to have sent Khamenei into retreat, ordering the Guardian Council to investigate claims of electoral fraud. If the combination of escalating street demonstrations and the politicking of Mousavi's backers inside the regime's councils prompts Khamenei to conclude that an Ahmadinejad victory is untenable, he could press the Guardian Council to heed the opposition's demand for a new vote - or, more likely, "adjust" the result so that no candidate has a clear majority, forcing a runoff election between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. Such a course would be a bitter pill for the Supreme Leader, dealing a body blow to his efforts to install Ahmadinejad and mocking his authority by forcing him to reverse himself. Whatever its outcome, this crisis has badly damaged Khamenei's credibility within the regime, heralding the onset of a bitter backroom struggle in the coming years to choose his successor. As to whether he'll sound the retreat on the election, however, his own preference and the likely tooth-and-nail resistance to any reversal from Ahmadinejad and the security establishment that backs him mean that Khamenei may be more likely to seek a compromise that keeps the incumbent in place. That may require ...


Four: A "Zimbabwe" Option?
The option that would likely hold the most appeal to Khamenei now would be to broker an agreement similar to the one that has kept Zimbabwe's President, Robert Mugabe, in power despite essentially losing an election - by bludgeoning the opposition into settling for an important yet subordinate role in his government. Already, Khamenei has appealed to a sense of national unity and preserving the regime, hoping to cajole the opposition into accepting the results. And at his first press conference following the announcement of his victory, Ahmadinejad reportedly asked his opponents to submit lists of candidates for membership in his Cabinet. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad may be hoping that standing firm and having the Guardian Council affirm his victory after a 10-day recount will produce enough opposition fatigue, which, combined with the threat of violence, will see the protests peter out. By so doing, Khamenei would hope that the pragmatic conservatives - embodied by Mousavi - can be weaned away from the reformists (led by former President Mohammed Khatami) by giving them a stake in a national unity government and promises to moderate Ahmadinejad's style of governance. However, that scenario would come into play only if Mousavi believed that he was losing the battle and risked disaster by keeping his supporters out on the street. Right now, there are no signs that the opposition feels beaten. (Mugabe's opponents settled for the deal only when they had been so pummeled that they could see no hope of unseating him.) Which is why all four options may remain in play while the various camps test one another's strength in the coming days.

[Anmar]

I read this article on yahoo this morning.  I think #2 is most likely, although i'm hoping for a new election, maybe with international moniters. 

[Varmit]

This might be a case of the tail wagging the dog.  Either way, haven't we learned our lesson.  When has getting involved in another country's politics ever paid off for us?-Anmar

I know you said "international moniters" but it is kinda the same thing isn't it? 

[Anmar]

let me elaborate...

An international moniter is a neutral party who doesn't participate or influence.

[Warph]

Regardless of whether or not the Green Revolution in Iran succeeds in the coming days, the collective recognition by ordinary Iranians that it is, after all, their country.... that its guidance and direction are not the property of one ideological faction or certain privileged clerics.... is unlikely to fade.  Once you learn how to drive a car, you don't forget.  Once you've created space that has commanded the world's attention and caused armed rulers to hesitate, you are a factor in history and a force to be reckoned with, whether a million people come back on the street for another six days, or 16 days, or 60 days.  One thing for sure, Neda, "the Voice," will be the rallying cry for days to come.

[Anmar]

ABC and BBC both showed Ahmedinejad leading by a 2-1 margin on May 11th, just before the elecetion.  You may very well be seeing the will of the people.  It's funny how media campaigns grab the hold of people.

[Warph]

Yeah... the Guardian ran a story on this last week:


"The election results in Iran may reflect the will of the Iranian people. Many experts are claiming that the margin of victory of incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the result of fraud or manipulation, but our nationwide public opinion survey of Iranians three weeks before the vote showed Ahmadinejad leading by a more than 2 to 1 margin – greater than his actual apparent margin of victory in Friday's election.

While western news reports from Tehran in the days leading up to the voting portrayed an Iranian public enthusiastic about Ahmadinejad's principal opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, our scientific sampling from across all 30 of Iran's provinces showed Ahmadinejad well ahead.

Independent and uncensored nationwide surveys of Iran are rare. Typically, pre-election polls there are either conducted or monitored by the government and are notoriously untrustworthy. By contrast, the poll undertaken by our nonprofit organisations from 11 May to 20 May was the third in a series over the past two years. Conducted by telephone from a neighbouring country, field work was carried out in Farsi by a polling company whose work in the region for ABC News and the BBC has received an Emmy award. Our polling was funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund."

Rest of the story at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jun/15/iran-election-polling

[Warph]

The U.S. Department of Defense is "on edge" over the turmoil in Iran, and has directed U.S. naval assets in the Persian Gulf to be, in layman's terms, in "non-incident mode," military officials told FOX News Monday.

Meanwhile, the former crown prince of Iran contended that members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard are showing "discontent" and some are "contemplating the contingency" of defying the regime in the wake of the Islamic Republic's disputed presidential election.

Rest of story at Fox News:
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/22/navy-hangs-persian-gulf-questions-mount-defecting-iranian-revolutionary-guard/