East Coast Happenings

[Ross]

Good one Warph.
I love it.

[jarhead]

Come on Warph. Don't you remember before you reached puberty the ol --" I hit you last----No, I hit you last---No, I hit you last "-----and the beat goes on !!!!!

[Diane Amberg]

Got the last wren house up today.They now have 5 to choose from. It's fun to watch the little male escorting the ladies around to view his properties.Sometimes they build practice nests before they settle down to stay.
    We've been watching the awful train derailment stories .That's the same train we took back and forth to Boston and New York for several years, just different times of day. The train version of the "black box" has been sent down here to Wilmington to the Amtrack building for investigation.
As always, our local stations are covering parts that aren't of interest to the big time Channels. I can personally attest to how bad parts of the tracks are on that North East Corridor. So far it doesn't seem anyone I knew was on the train, thank goodness...  do know some folks who work at the receiving hospitals and they should have some interesting stories to tell. The 188 had just stopped in Wilmington and the 30th Street Station before it derailed.
 
Now I'm going to make a statement and I don't care if certain self important judgmental people like it or not.That North East corridor is by far the busiest railroad in the entire US. Allowing it to have areas that haven't been updated and upgraded for many years due to lack of funding and help from Congress is such a travesty, it borders on criminal.That curve could and should have been straightened out a very long time ago. I'm just glad we haven't had more serious incidents before this and it was lucky so few died.. It will be interesting to see what the final report has to say.

[proelkco]

Thanks for the info and have a good day

[Warph]

Diane... a few items on:

49 CFR 213.57 - Curves; elevation and speed limitations.

AMTRAK, The Money Pit

CFR

Updates

Authorities (U.S. Code)

§ 213.57 Curves; elevation and speed limitations.
(a)  The maximum crosslevel on the outside rail of a curve may not be more than 8 inches on track Classes 1 and 2 and 7 inches on Classes 3 through 5. Except as provided in § 213.63, the outside rail of a curve may not be lower than the inside rail. (The first sentence of paragraph (a) is applicable September 21, 1999.)

(b)

(1)  The maximum allowable operating speed for each curve is determined by the following formula—

 


Where—

Vmax = Maximum allowable operating speed (miles per hour).

Ea = Actual elevation of the outside rail (inches). 1


Footnote(s):
1 Actual elevation for each 155 foot track segment in the body of the curve is determined by averaging the elevation for 10 points through the segment at 15.5 foot spacing. If the curve length is less than 155 feet, average the points through the full length of the body of the curve.


D = Degree of curvature (degrees). 2


Footnote(s):
2 Degree of curvature is determined by averaging the degree of curvature over the same track segment as the elevation.


(2)  Table 1 of appendix A is a table of maximum allowable operating speed computed in accordance with this formula for various elevations and degrees of curvature.

(c)

(1)  For rolling stock meeting the requirements specified in paragraph (d) of this section, the maximum operating speed for each curve may be determined by the following formula—

Where—

Vmax = Maximum allowable operating speed (miles per hour).

Ea = Actual elevation of the outside rail (inches). 1

D = Degree of curvature (degrees). 2

(2)  Table 2 of appendix A is a table of maximum allowable operating speed computed in accordance with this formula for various elevations and degrees of curvature.

(d)  Qualified equipment may be operated at curving speeds determined by the formula in paragraph (c) of this section, provided each specific class of equipment is approved for operation by the Federal Railroad Administration and the railroad demonstrates that:

(1)  When positioned on a track with a uniform 4-inch superelevation, the roll angle between the floor of the equipment and the horizontal does not exceed 5.7 degrees; and

(2)  When positioned on a track with a uniform 6 inch superelevation, no wheel of the equipment unloads to a value of 60 percent of its static value on perfectly level track, and the roll angle between the floor of the equipment and the horizontal does not exceed 8.6 degrees.

(3)  The track owner shall notify the Federal Railroad Administrator no less than 30 calendar days prior to the proposed implementation of the higher curving speeds allowed under the formula in paragraph (c) of this section. The notification shall be in writing and shall contain, at a minimum, the following information—

(i)  A complete description of the class of equipment involved, including schematic diagrams of the suspension systems and the location of the center of gravity above top of rail;

(ii)  A complete description of the test procedure 3 and instrumentation used to qualify the equipment and the maximum values for wheel unloading and roll angles which were observed during testing;


Footnote(s):
3 The test procedure may be conducted in a test facility whereby all the wheels on one side (right or left) of the equipment are alternately raised and lowered by 4 and 6 inches and the vertical wheel loads under each wheel are measured and a level is used to record the angle through which the floor of the equipment has been rotated.


(iii)  Procedures or standards in effect which relate to the maintenance of the suspension system for the particular class of equipment; and

(iv)  Identification of line segment on which the higher curving speeds are proposed to be implemented.

(e)  A track owner, or an operator of a passenger or commuter service, who provides passenger or commuter service over trackage of more than one track owner with the same class of equipment may provide written notification to the Federal Railroad Administrator with the written consent of the other affected track owners.

(f)  Equipment presently operating at curving speeds allowed under the formula in paragraph (c) of this section, by reason of conditional waivers granted by the Federal Railroad Administration, shall be considered to have successfully complied with the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section.

(g)  A track owner or a railroad operating above Class 5 speeds, may request approval from the Federal Railroad Administrator to operate specified equipment at a level of cant deficiency greater than four inches in accordance with § 213.329(c) and (d) on curves in Class 1 through 5 track which are contiguous to the high speed track provided that—

(1)  The track owner or railroad submits a test plan to the Federal Railroad Administrator for approval no less than thirty calendar days prior to any proposed implementation of the higher curving speeds. The test plan shall include an analysis and determination of carbody acceleration safety limits for each vehicle type which indicate wheel unloading of 60 percent in a steady state condition and 80 percent in a transient (point by point) condition. Accelerometers shall be laterally-oriented and floor-mounted near the end of a representative vehicle of each type;

(2)  Upon FRA approval of a test plan, the track owner or railroad conducts incrementally increasing train speed test runs over the curves in the identified track segment(s) to demonstrate that wheel unloading is within the limits prescribed in paragraph (g)(1) of this section;

(3)  Upon FRA approval of a cant deficiency level, the track owner or railroad inspects the curves in the identified track segment with a Track Geometry Measurement System (TGMS) qualified in accordance with § 213.333 (b) through (g) at an inspection frequency of at least twice annually with not less than 120 days interval between inspections; and

(4)  The track owner or railroad operates an instrumented car having dynamic response characteristics that are representative of other equipment assigned to service or a portable device that monitors on-board instrumentation on trains over the curves in the identified track segment at the revenue speed profile at a frequency of at least once every 90-day period with not less than 30 days interval between inspections. The instrumented car or the portable device shall monitor a laterally-oriented accelerometer placed near the end of the vehicle at the floor level. If the carbody lateral acceleration measurement exceeds the safety limits prescribed in paragraph (g)(1), the railroad shall operate trains at curving speeds in accordance with paragraph (b) or (c) of this section; and

(5)  The track owner or railroad shall maintain a copy of the most recent exception printouts for the inspections required under paragraphs (g)(3) and (4) of this section.


33992 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 119 / Monday, June 22, 1998 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 213
[Docket No. RST–90–1, Notice No. 8]
RIN 2130–AA75
Track Safety Standards
AGENCY: Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: FRA amends the Track Safety
Standards to update and enhance its
track safety regulatory program. To
address today's railroad operating
environment, these amendments present
additional regulatory requirements,
including standards specifically
addressing high speed train operations.
FRA issues these changes to improve
track safety and provide the railroad
industry with the flexibility needed to
effect a safer and more efficient use of
resources. The amendments reflect
recommendations submitted to FRA by
the Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee. The provisions included in
this notice become effective with this
rule. However, FRA anticipates that
further amendments will be added to
address the use of Gage Restraint
Measuring Systems.
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is
effective September 21, 1998.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Allison H. MacDowell, Office of Safety
Enforcement, Federal Railroad
Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C.
20590 (telephone: 202–632–3344), or
Nancy Lummen Lewis, Office of Chief
Counsel, Federal Railroad
Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C.
20590 (telephone: 202–632–3174).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Introduction
The first Federal Track Safety
Standards were implemented in
October, 1971, following the enactment
of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of
1970 in which Congress granted to FRA
comprehensive authority over ''all areas
of railroad safety.'' See 36 FR 20336 and
49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq. FRA envisioned
the new standards to be an evolving set
of safety requirements subject to
continuous revision allowing the
regulations to keep pace with industry
innovations and agency research and
development.
FRA amended the Track Safety
Standards with minor revisions several
times in the past two decades. It began
a project to revise the standards
extensively in 1978, but later withdrew
the effort when investigation revealed
that considerably more data collection
and analysis were necessary to support
recommended revisions. A less
extensive revision of the Track Safety
Standards was issued in November,
1982. Since then, FRA has acquired
much information crucial to further
development of the Track Safety
Standards through the enhanced
statistical analysis capabilities resulting
from additional field reporting
requirements and improved data
collection processes.
Statutory Background
The Rail Safety Enforcement and
Review Act of 1992, Public Law 102–
365, 106 Stat. 972 (September 3, 1992),
later amended by the Federal Railroad
Safety Authorization Act of 1994, Public
Law 103–440, 108 Stat. 4615 (November
2, 1994), requires FRA to revise the
track safety regulations contained in 49
CFR Part 213. Now codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 20142, the amended statute requires:
(a) Review of Existing Regulations.—Not
later than March 3, 1993, the Secretary of
Transportation shall begin a review of
Department of Transportation regulations
related to track safety standards. The review
at least shall include an evaluation of—
(1) Procedures associated with maintaining
and installing continuous welded rail and its
attendant structure, including cold weather
installation procedures;
(2) The need for revisions to regulations on
track excepted from track safety standards;
and
(3) Employee safety.
(b) Revision of Regulations.—Not later than
September 1, 1995, the Secretary shall
prescribe regulations and issue orders to
revise track safety standards, considering
safety information presented during the
review under subsection (a) of this section
and the report of the Comptroller General
submitted under subsection (c) of this
section.
* * * * *
(d) Identification of Internal Rail Defects.—
In carrying out subsections (a) and (b), the
Secretary shall consider whether or not to
prescribe regulations and issue orders
concerning—
(1) Inspection procedures to identify
internal rail defects, before they reach
imminent failure size, in rail that has
significant shelling; and
(2) Any specific actions that should be
taken when a rail surface condition, such as
shelling, prevents the identification of
internal defects.
Petitions for Rulemaking
In May, 1990, the Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employes (BMWE)
filed a petition with FRA to revise the
Track Safety Standards. The petition
suggested substantive changes to the
standards, the addition of new
regulations addressing recent
developments in the industry, as well as
the reinstatement of many of the
regulations deleted from the standards
in 1982. The BMWE also petitioned
FRA to further address employee safety
by incorporating in the Track Safety
Standards certain sections of the
Occupational Safety and Health
Standards presently administered by the
U.S. Department of Labor.
In March, 1992, the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) submitted to
FRA a list of recommended revisions to
the Track Safety Standards. The AAR
suggested some changes in the wording
of existing regulations to provide
additional flexibility to accommodate
future innovations in railroad
technology. Several suggested revisions
included new approaches to
determining compliance with certain
existing regulations. Most notable
among those was AAR's proposal that
the revised track standards permit the
use of a Gage Restraint Measuring
System (GRMS) in place of detailed
crosstie and fastener requirements.
Proceedings to Date
On November 16, 1992, FRA
published an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in this
docket. See 57 FR 54038. The ANPRM
summarized FRA's knowledge about
developments in the rail industry in the
past two decades and then posed some
52 questions regarding how those
developments should be addressed in
the revised track safety standards.
The ANPRM also announced plans for
four public workshops in which
technically-knowledgeable persons with
specialized experience in track
maintenance were invited to share their
views with FRA in an informal setting.
The workshops were fact-finding
sessions comprised of informal giveand-
take exchanges between industry,
labor, and government professionals
charged with the administration of the
track safety standards on a day-to-day
basis. They constituted an initial step by
FRA to use more active collaboration
with labor, railroad management,
manufacturers, state governments, and
public interest associations in
structuring the revised regulations.
Participants in the workshops
included representatives of major and
short line railroads, the AAR, the
American Short Line Railroad
Association (ASLRA), the BMWE, as
well as individuals with a particular
interest in certain areas of the track
safety standards. In addition to the
workshops, FRA invited interested
Federal Register /Vol. 63, No. 119 /Monday, June 22, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 33993
persons to submit written comments to
the questions posed in the ANPRM.
Approximately 30 individuals,
railroads, and industry groups
submitted their suggestions and
observations.
Following one workshop which
included an extensive discussion about
the safety of maintenance-of-way
employees, FRA decided to isolate that
issue from this proceeding so that it
could be addressed thoroughly in a
separate rulemaking. That issue became
the focus of a proceeding addressing
roadway worker safety, FRA's first
negotiated rulemaking. FRA established
its first formal regulatory negotiation
committee in 1994. After months of
discussions and debates, the committee
reached consensus conclusions and
recommended provisions for an NPRM
to the Federal Railroad Administrator
(Administrator) on May 17, 1995. An
NPRM based upon those
recommendations was published on
March 14, 1996 (see 61 FR 10528), and
a final rule was issued on December 16,
1996 (see 61 FR 65959). Thus, a
significant portion of the mandate of the
Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act
of 1992 calling for a general revision of
the Track Safety Standards already has
become effective.
The Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee and the Track Working
Group
In past rulemakings, interested parties
generally have approached the
proceedings in an adversarial manner, a
tactic that often inhibited the
development of the best regulatory
solutions to resolve difficult safety
issues. In addition, parties also have
resorted to pressuring Congress for
legislation that would grant regulatory
results with which FRA disagreed or
were at odds with FRA's regulatory
agenda. FRA concluded, therefore, that
inclusion of these parties in its
regulatory process would result in a
more positive approach to developing
the best solutions to pressing safety
problems.
Although FRA gathered much
information in the 1993 track
workshops, as well as in similar
workshops associated with other
rulemaking proceedings, the agency
recognized that continued use of these
''ad hoc'' collaborative procedures for
each rulemaking was not the most
effective means of accomplishing the
agency's goal of achieving a more
consensus-based regulatory program.
Following the success in 1995 of the
negotiated rulemaking addressing
roadway worker safety, FRA decided
that several pending rulemakings,
including this proceeding to revise Part
213, should advance under a new
rulemaking model that relies upon
consensus among various members of
the affected industry and the regulated
community. On March 11, 1996, FRA
announced formation of the Railroad
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), the
centerpiece of the agency's new
regulatory program which emphasizes
rulemaking by consensus with those
most affected by the agency's
regulations. See 61 FR 740.
The RSAC is comprised of 48
individual representatives drawn from
27 member organizations. The
membership of the RSAC is
representative of those interested in
railroad safety issues, including railroad
owners, manufacturers, labor groups,
state government groups, and public
interest associations. It's sponsor is the
Administrator, who recommends
specific issues for it to address. The
RSAC operates by consensus. It is
authorized to establish smaller
''working groups'' to research and
initially address the issues
recommended by the Administrator and
accepted by the RSAC to resolve.
Most of the text of this final rule was
recommended to FRA by the RSAC. The
committee was tasked by the
Administrator to formulate and present
to FRA recommendations for new
regulations and revisions of existing
ones.
In accordance with established RSAC
procedures, RSAC formed a Track
Working Group, comprised of
approximately 30 representatives from
railroads, rail labor, trade associations,
state government, track equipment
manufacturers, and FRA, to develop and
draft a proposed rule for the revision of
Part 213. It met periodically over a span
of six months in 1996.
The Track Working Group identified
issues for discussion from several
sources. One source of issues was, of
course, the statutory mandates issued by
Congress in 1992 and in 1994. Two
other sources were the BMWE's petition
and AAR proposals. Several issues came
to the Track Working Group by way of
requests for consideration made by
FRA's track safety Technical Resolution
Committee. The group also examined
track issues involved in a number of
recommendations made to FRA by the
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) in the past decade. Discussions
utilized information acquired by FRA
through its research and development
program, as well as from findings from
routine agency investigations and
accident investigations. Finally, the
Track Working Group systematically
surveyed the existing regulations to
identify those sections and subsections
that needed updating or, in some cases,
deletion.
At a public meeting on October 31,
1996, the Track Working Group
presented its proposed rule to the RSAC
for approval to recommend it to the
Administrator. As required by RSAC
procedures, each provision in the
proposed rule had received unanimous
approval by the members of the Track
Working Group. At the request of the
BMWE, the RSAC agreed to defer the
vote on whether to recommend the
proposed rule to the Administrator to
provide that organization additional
time to inform its members. At the time
of the formal vote by mail on November
21, 1996, representatives of many of the
labor unions withdrew support of the
proposed rule and recommended that it
be returned to the Track Working Group
for further discussion.
Despite the lack of support by many
RSAC representatives of rail labor, the
number of votes cast in favor of
recommending the proposed rule to the
Administrator exceeded the number
necessary for a simple majority. RSAC's
procedures provide that where there is
a majority vote to recommend to the
Administrator a rule presented to the
RSAC with full consensus of the
working group that produced it, the
RSAC will recommend adoption of the
rule by the Administrator. Following
those procedures, the RSAC formally
recommended to the Administrator that
FRA issue the proposed rule as it was
drafted.
On July 3, 1997, FRA published a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
which included substantially the same
rule text and preamble developed by the
Track Working Group. See 62 FR 36138.
In developing the regulatory evaluation
for the NPRM, FRA attempted to
incorporate additional data in the cost/
benefit analysis beyond the impact data
provided by the Track Working Group.
In the NPRM, FRA requested additional
relevant data to use in the regulatory
evaluation for this final rule, but parties
who had access to relevant data did not
respond to that request.
Comments and Responses
The NPRM generated comments from
12 sources. Four of the commenters,
namely, the AAR, the BMWE, the
ASLRA, and Amtrak, were represented
on the Track Working Group and helped
draft the recommended rule which
became the basis for the NPRM. All four
of those commenters expressed support
for the RSAC process.
The BMWE stated that it agrees with
many of the revisions proposed in the
NPRM, but that the standards proposed
33994 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 119 / Monday, June 22, 1998 / Rules and Regulations
therein ''do not go far enough to ensure
the integrity of the track structure.'' The
BMWE stated that ''several significant
deficiencies'' led that group, as well as
RSAC members representing other labor
organizations, to recommend to RSAC
that the proposed rule as drafted by the
Track Working Group be returned to
that group for further consideration.
The AAR, in its comments to the
docket, stated that it continues to
support the NPRM and the language
drafted by the Track Working Group.
However, the AAR also added a request
that should FRA revise any of the
proposed rule in direct response to
comments by RSAC participants who
withdrew support of the rule drafted by
the Track Working Group, then FRA
would also re-examine the positions the
AAR originally expressed about those
issues. The AAR stated that its support
of the proposed rule reflects that
organization's willingness to
compromise some of its positions in the
interest in reaching consensus about the
proposed rule in the Track Working
Group. Therefore, the AAR's general
support of the NPRM should not be
misconstrued as agreement by the
organization with each and every
provision of the NPRM.
FRA has not significantly changed the
NPRM based on comments from other
RSAC participants who withdrew
support for the rule proposed by the
Track Working Group. Thus the AAR's
suggested revisions based on that
contingency are not examined in the
''Section By Section Analysis'' portion
of this final rule.
Continuous Welded Rail (CWR)
In the first track safety standards
published in 1971, § 213.119 dealt with
CWR in a rather general manner, stating
simply that CWR must be installed at a
rail temperature that prevents lateral
displacement of track or pull-aparts of
rail ends, and that it should not be
disturbed at rail temperatures higher
than the installation or adjusted
installation temperature. (See 36 FR
20341.) In 1979, when FRA proposed a
significant revision of Part 213, the
agency suggested that this subsection be
eliminated because it provided ''little
guidance to railroads'' and was
''difficult to enforce.'' The agency
further stated that research had ''not
advanced to the point where specific
safety requirements can be established.''
(See 44 FR 52114.) However, when the
proposed revision was withdrawn in
1981 (see 46 FR 32896), the proposal to
eliminate § 213.119 was also
abandoned. In the November, 1982
revisions to the Track Safety Standards,
§ 213.119 was deleted.
In the Rail Safety Enforcement and
Review Act of 1992, Congress mandated
FRA to evaluate procedures for
installing and maintaining CWR. In
1994, in the Federal Railroad
Authorization Act, Congress added an
evaluation of cold weather installation
procedures to that mandate. In light of
the evaluation of those procedures, as
well as information resulting from
FRA's own research and development,
this final rule returns CWR procedures
to Part 213.
CWR is naturally subjected to high
compressive and tensile forces which, if
not adequately restrained, can result in
track buckling or pull-aparts. The
potential for track buckling increases as
the ambient air temperature increases
while the potential for pull-aparts
increases as the ambient air temperature
decreases. Track buckling tends to occur
under train movement and therefore can
be instantaneous and somewhat
unpredictable.
In recent years, FRA engaged in a
research program to develop criteria and
guidelines for improving CWR's
resistance to buckling. The program
sought to (1) define critical forces and
conditions associated with track
buckling, (2) quantify parameters which
govern the resistance of track to
buckling, and (3) develop technology to
detect incipient failures prior to track
buckling. Railroads have also invested
considerable resources into CWR
research and employee training which
has resulted in a marked decrease in the
number of reportable buckled track
incidents over the last decade. FRA's
Accident/Incident data base reveals that
the number of reportable buckled track
derailments has been reduced by
approximately 50% since 1985,
dropping from a yearly average of
approximately 60 instances to
approximately 30 such occurrences per
year.
How a railroad provides the adequate
lateral resistance to prevent track
buckling may vary from railroad to
railroad. The Track Working Group
found that consistent methodology is
not as important as effective
methodology in installing and
maintaining CWR. Therefore, the Track
Working Group's recommendations and
the new subsection (§ 213.119) are
premised on the concept that the
regulations should provide railroads
with as much flexibility as safely
feasible. The new subsection allows
railroads to develop and implement
their individual CWR programs based
on procedures which have proven
effective for them over the years. At a
minimum, procedures shall be
developed for the installation,
adjustment, maintenance, and
inspection of CWR, as well as a training
program and minimal requirements for
recordkeeping. FRA fully expects the
railroad industry to take advantage of
continuing research initiatives to update
and enhance their CWR procedures, and
cautions railroads not to develop less
than acceptable CWR procedures as a
means to lessen the effect of regulatory
oversight. FRA will monitor the
railroads' adherence to these procedures
as well as the overall effectiveness of the
CWR programs.
While the CWR provision, as
proposed, received support from some
commenters (the NTSB), others were
critical of the new provision. The AAR
called it ''a classic case of
overregulation'' and suggested that the
provision require track owners only to
have CWR procedures and training
programs in effect and accessible to
FRA. While it supported the provision
as a means to enhance track safety, the
BMWE also advised that the provision
lacks a means to address railroads' noncompliance
with their own CWR
programs. The ASLRA suggested that
railroads should have the option of
excluding from their CWR plans any
trackage over which trains do not
operate at speeds over 30 m.p.h. and
which do not exceed one million gross
ton miles in traffic annually. The AAR
also stated that it generally supports the
provision as drafted by the Track
Working Group and that its suggestions
for changes were to be considered only
in the event FRA decides to revise the
proposed provision in response to
recommendations of other RSAC
participants who, after helping to draft
the recommended NPRM, withdrew
support for the recommendation. All
three commenters who expressed
negative comments were active
participants in the Track Working
Group and helped to draft the language
which adds the provision for CWR in
this final rule.
Excepted Track
With some limitations, the excepted
track regulation permits railroads to
designate track as ''excepted'' from
compliance with minimum safety
requirements for roadbed, track
geometry and track structure. FRA
added the excepted track provision
(§ 213.4) to the regulations in 1982 in
response to an industry outcry for
regulatory relief on those rail lines
producing little or no income. FRA
believed that without some relief for
low density lines, railroads would
accelerate abandonment of those lines
rather than invest their slim resources
where returns would be limited.
Federal Register /Vol. 63, No. 119 /Monday, June 22, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 33995
Therefore, the 1982 revision provided
the industry with a means to operate
over designated tracks without
complying with the substantive
requirements of the Track Safety
Standards. FRA believed that the
designated tracks would be located in
yards or otherwise on comparatively
level terrain in areas where the
likelihood was remote that a derailment
would endanger a train crew or the
general public.
The 1982 provision contains a
number of operating restrictions,
including limitations on where excepted
track can be located and the number of
cars containing hazardous materials
(five) that can be hauled in one train.
Maximum speed is 10 m.p.h., and
passenger service is prohibited.
Despite these limitations, railroads
have embraced the concept of excepted
track. In 1992, an FRA survey revealed
the existence of approximately 12,000
miles of designated excepted track
nationwide, far more than FRA
envisioned when the provision was
added to the regulations. Recent surveys
conducted by the AAR and the ASLRA
indicate that between 8,000 and 9,000
miles of excepted track presently exist
nationwide.
Comments to the ANPRM, the NPRM,
as well as some opinions expressed
within the Track Working Group,
showed that many railroads favor
maintaining an excepted track provision
in the Track Safety Standards. They
argued that accident and injury data do
not support the notion that trackage in
''excepted'' status presents any
significant safety hazard. FRA's data
show that between 1990 and 1995,
track-caused derailments on excepted
track caused three reportable injuries
and one release of hazardous materials.
In commenting on the NPRM, the
ASLRA stated that, in a recent survey of
short line railroads, 146 railroads that
reported having excepted track had 122
reportable accidents in a five-year
period from 1991 through 1995. Of
those accidents, 87 were track-related.
The ASLRA strenuously argued that
short line railroads depend on the
excepted track provision in order to
keep certain track segments in business.
Many short lines operate over track they
acquired just before abandonment by a
major railroad. A significant number of
those lines serve only a handful of
industries with comparatively small
gross tonnage. The ASLRA commented
that the cost to short line railroads to
upgrade and maintain excepted track
would exceed $230 million. Elimination
of the excepted track provision would
cause the abandonment of
approximately 95 lines affecting 1,063
shippers who may be then compelled to
use highway transportation.
Approximately 65% of all reportable
derailments on excepted track from
1988 through the third quarter of 1995
were track-caused. Of those, nearly 33%
were attributed to wide gage as a result
of defective crossties or rail fasteners.
Several commenters expressed approval
of some type of gage restriction. The
BMWE suggested that the revised
provision should also address the
condition and placement of ties and
fasteners, as well as switch maintenance
and rail/joint bar defects.
The AAR commented that the gage
restrictions proposed in the NPRM
should be eliminated. The AAR stated
that there are situations where wide
gage is safe, for instance, in road
crossings. In those cases, pavement
would have to be destroyed and
replaced to correct wide gage when the
pavement would have restricted wheel
position and prevented a derailment.
The AAR also stated that it recommends
that the gage restriction be eliminated
only if FRA decides to revise the
proposed provision based on the
comments of other RSAC participants
who helped draft the recommendations
and then later withdrew support of
them. Otherwise, the AAR supports the
NPRM as drafted by the Track Working
Group.
Because none of the commenters
presented FRA with a compelling
reason to make further changes to the
gage restrictions in the excepted track
provision, this final rule adopts the
language as recommended by the Track
Working Group and as proposed in the
NPRM. Under this final rule, track
owners must maintain gage to a 581⁄4¢¢
standard and perform periodic switch
inspections.
FRA and state inspectors have found
instances where railroads have taken
advantage of the permissive language in
the 1982 provision to conduct
operations in a manner not envisioned
when FRA drafted the provision. For
example, a railroad removes a segment
of track from the excepted designation
only long enough to move a train with
more than five cars carrying hazardous
materials, or to operate an excursion
passenger train, and then replaces the
segment in excepted status as soon as
the movement is completed. The BMWE
and the NTSB suggested that the revised
provision include time limits for the use
of this provision over any segment of
track. The final rule adopts the language
as proposed in the NPRM and requires
railroads to provide FRA with
notification 10 days prior to removing
track from excepted status.
The revision also changes the word
''revenue'' to ''occupied'' in describing
passenger trains prohibited from
operating over excepted track. This
change codifies FRA's long-standing
interpretation of the 1982 provision
which allowed trains on excepted track
to be occupied by crews, work gangs,
and other railroad employees attending
to their job-related duties. It is also
designed to dispel the misconception by
some railroads that passengers could be
hauled over excepted track as long as
they were not charged, and the railroad
received no ''revenue,'' for their
transportation. The purpose of the
passenger prohibition is to safeguard
railroad passengers; its purpose is not
concerned with the revenue-generating
power of passenger service.
Liability Standard
The current track regulations are
enforced against a track owner ''who
knows or has notice'' that the track does
not meet compliance standards. This
knowledge standard is unique to the
track regulations; other FRA regulations
are based on strict liability. The
knowledge standard is founded on the
notion that railroads cannot prevent the
occurrence of some defects in track
structures that are continually changing
in response to the loads imposed on
them by traffic and effects of weather.
Many defects may not be detected even
when the track owner exercises
reasonable care. Therefore, track owners
should be held responsible only for
those defects about which they know or
should know. Today, even after years of
track abandonments by major railroads,
the industry is responsible for
maintaining about 200,000 miles of
track. Many defects occur suddenly in
remote areas, making it difficult for even
the most diligent track inspectors to
keep pace with all defects as they
happen.
With a knowledge standard attached
to the track regulations, railroads are
held liable for non-compliance or civil
penalties for only those defects that they
knew about or those that are so evident
the railroad is deemed to have known
about them. FRA and state inspectors
meet this knowledge standard in a
number of ways. Sometimes they record
and notify a railroad of a defect that
they find, and then re-inspect later to
see if the defect has been repaired. If it
has not, they may cite the railroad for
a violation of the track safety standards.
While this method provides a failsafe
way of proving railroad notice of a
defect, it is not always practicable for
inspectors to perform follow-up
inspections. Such a system would make
railroads responsible only for defects
33996 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 119 / Monday, June 22, 1998 / Rules and Regulations
FRA already has detected, which is
clearly not a sufficient incentive to
comply.
Often, inspectors choose to inspect
the railroad's own inspection records to
see if a defect they have noted is
recorded there. If it is, the inspection
record forms proof that the railroad had
notice of the defect. If the defect is not
recorded in the railroad's inspection
records, but is of the nature that it
would have had to exist at the time of
the railroad's last inspection (for
example, defective crossties or certain
breaks that are covered with rust) and
would have been detected with the
exercise of reasonable care, the defect's
existence constitutes constructive
knowledge by the railroad and the
railroad is cited for a violation. FRA's
reading of its ''knows or has notice''
standard has been its long-standing
enforcement policy and is explained in
FRA's Track Enforcement Manual.
In its petition, the BMWE suggested
that FRA put track owners under a strict
liability standard by removing the
phrase ''knows or has notice'' from
§ 213.5. Under that standard, any defect
found by an FRA inspector could be
written as a violation regardless of the
railroad's ignorance of it or the
railroad's opportunity to have detected
it under the required inspection
schedule. The AAR requested in its
petition that FRA develop performance
standards for the track regulations.
Certain defects would not be cited as
long as the track is performing safely,
making unnecessary many of the
regulations (for example, inspection
requirements and the minimum number
of crossties). The inherent weakness in
such a proposal is that railroads will
develop differing internal requirements
for track inspection and maintenance.
Some railroads may not be as vigilant as
others in spotting defects or potential
defects. Track defects compromising
safety may not be discovered until the
track fails, causing a derailment and
possibly injuries and death.
Neither the BMWE nor the AAR
provided FRA with cost/benefit
information to support their respective
requests.



More Continued on Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION/Federal Railroad Administration:

https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/49/213.57

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-06-22/pdf/98-15932.pdf#page=38

[Diane Amberg]

Are you making me take a test after this? More is starting to come out about the speed of the train .I know that curve, and there are many who ride over it every day.70 is the top speed for entering the turn and usually there is a slow down during it with a gradual speed up when the last car has exited. It does tend to make one rock and roll to the left and right at any speed. There is another very rough area near Providence. I have a friend who, before retirement, was an Amtrack engineer.We called him Chooch ,or ChooChoo.I haven't caught up with him yet, but I'm interested in what he has to say about all this, especially what happened to the engineer. Since this the second wreck there perhaps this time the curve can be straightened some what. Shutting down the entire corridor is tough on everyone as it is very heavily used.

[Diane Amberg]

So, now more information is starting to come out about the train wreck.Instead of screaming to shut down AMTRAK, in favor of I don't know what, stop second guessing what actually happened and wait for the final reports. Don't  totally blame the engineer just yet. There was something weird going on.

[redcliffsw]

Do you believe that Amtrak is your benefit from the government (tyrants)?

[Ross]

Yep, more is coming out.
The train was not shot at.Speed kills!
100 mph on a 50 mph curve now lowered to 45 mph.
Waiting for more facts.

[Ross]