Landing Force Manual, 1898

[S. Quentin Quale, Esq.]

This might be of interest to folks doing a Navy/Marine Corps. impression for the years in question.

The original version of the Landing Force Manual was prepared and published in 1891 by three officers (two Naval and one Army). The Navy determined that it would follow Army practice in land combat, vice Marine Corps practice, to ensure standardization. At this time the Marine Corps was in transition from an on board "police force" to something else. Indeed, many Naval Officers questioned the need to continue the Corp's existence as the Navy transitioned from sail to steam. Teddy Roosevelt is credited with the decision to maintain the Corps and it began to develop its role as an amphibious force. The Spanish-American War gave impetus to this transition, particularly the sterling performance of the Corps in the seizure of Guantanamo.

The 1891 version is not on-line (at least I've not been able to find it). This is the 1898 version.

http://books.google.com/books?id=An9MAAAAYAAJ&source=gbs_similarbooks

Additional versions were done over the years until, in the late 1930s (IIRC) the Landing Party Manual became the official doctrine for land and amphibious operations for the Navy and Marine Corps.  A version of the LPM remains in use today.

SQQ

[Pitspitr]

Google books is a great source for electronic versions of out of print military manuals, Here are links to a few of my favorites:

http://books.google.com/books/reader?id=Aps0AQAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader

https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=rqpEAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=en

https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=DB9IAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=en

https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=jWgDAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=en

[cpt dan blodgett]

Be really careful with this information lest a Marine find out, but the Army conducted  more amphibious landings in WWII than the Marines

[Niederlander]

Yes they did, using the Marine Corps' manuals and doctrine.

[Pitspitr]

Yes they did, using the Marine Corps' manuals and doctrine.

I sense a storm brewing

[Sir Charles deMouton-Black]

Very interesting.  The second link got me " Error 404 ".

[Pitspitr]

Very interesting.  The second link got me " Error 404 ".

It's working for me? Are any of the other links not working for you?

[cpt dan blodgett]

Yes they did, using the Marine Corps' manuals and doctrine.

Which probably were based at least in part on the original amphibious manuals written by the Navy and Army.

Having said that the Marines now own amphib warfare.

[S. Quentin Quale, Esq.]

From my study the Army was actually rather successful in their amphibious ops. 

Prior to WWII it was almost an article of faith that an amphibious operation against an entrenched, well defended beach was impossible.  The proof was the British failure at Gallipoli.  Actually that "proof" was highly questionable.  The Marines during the '30s, in conjunction with the then quite small Gator Navy, did question that "proof" and came up with a plan that could work.  It was put into effect during WWII.  As with any new plan there were complications. Early experiences, as at Tarawa, were not always happy ones.  Fortunately, we didn't "hang" the senior officers responsible for the planning but rather let them learn and future ops were much more successful.

The Army watched and learned and they, too, became quite adept.  In the Pacific those ops were mostly rather small (until you get to the invasions of Guam, Saipan, and the PI).  In the Atlantic/Med they were fewer in number but very large operations.

The old saying that "amateurs study tactics and professionals study logistics" is never more true than in amphibious ops.  One major difference between the Atlantic and Pacific ops is that the only really "long range" LANTFLEET invasion was Operation Torch in North Africa.  All of the others were launched from secure bases with relatively short lines of supply.  In the Pacific I can't think of one (except, maybe, for some of the ops in the Solomons and surrounding islands) where the line of supply wasn't hundreds, if not thousands, of miles long.

The Army also had, in its background, the operation against Cuba.  Frankly, it was a Charlie Foxtrot.  The Army in 1898 had no experience in "out CONUS" operations.  The Navy was  not a whole lot better, but at least had thought about it and had a plan (however untried).  The Army was frankly embarrassed badly by their logistical failures and really did start to think about what they needed to do.  Not only did they have to supply Cuba, they needed to support an operation in the PI (that would drag on for almost 13 years).  This was the OJT that would give them real world experience in combat support.  It would pay big dividends in WWI and really come to fruition in WWII.

The Army's biggest PHIBOPS failure was Anzio.  It was a good idea that went wrong when the ground commander failed to aggressively push forward and seize tactically crucial positions.  One reason given for this failure was that a major portion of the sea lift to support the operation was scheduled to be transferred from the Med to Britain as part of the build up for Overlord.  I'm not sure I buy that, as the tactical surprise achieved was pretty much total and the "window of opportunity" was wide open.  Yes, it would have been a risk to put rather small forces out front and then work like Hell to back them up but the alternative, which happened, was to let those crucial positions be occupied by a resourceful enemy.  In reality the Army paid a heavy price for what amounts to a failure of aggressive leadership.  Another hallmark of PHIBOPS is that they really do tend to be "all or nothing" affairs.  The failure at Gallipoli was similar.

SQQ

[Guns Garrett]

U.S. Marine LtCol E.H. "Pete" Ellis pretty much "wrote the book" (quite literally) on amphibious operations in 1921.  Prior to this, ship-to-shore operations mainly consisted of rowing soldiers ashore in open boats.  His "Operations Plan 714" was part of the War Dept's "War Plan Orange" - a plan for the scenario of a possible conflict with Japan. His plans encompassed nearly the entire scope of the operation - from moving men and materiel ashore, supply, support, and types of craft required, including non-existant ones that needed to be designed.   20 years later, his theory was put to practice - a virtual blueprint of how we actually conducted that Theatre.  His writings were incorporated into the tactical doctrines of both the Army, Navy and Marine Corps.  In 1948 the Marine Corps added another dimension by publishing  "Amphibious Operations—Employment of Helicopters (Tentative)", or Phib-31, which was the first manual for helicopter airmobile operations.  Nearly a decade later, the U.S. Army followed suit, publishing "FM 57-35, Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations."