Would Custer's 7th really been better off if armed with Spencers & Schofield

[Trailrider]

I can't say how the Crow could precisely convey a certain number larger than 100 (don't speak Crow and only a little Lakota), but if nothing else the scouts could have pointed to Custer and his troops, then to a pile of horse droppings while waving their arms and pointing in the direction of the hostiles, and making an encompassing motion. Roughly translated it would convey the idea, "Yellow Hair Chief, if you attack those Indians, you will be in deep 'stuff'!" 

So far as what is written in books is concerned, once you get past primary historical sources, just about everything gets modified a bit. Sorta like the old kid's party game, "Telephone", where a phrase is whispered from one player to another. The final message received is usually quite different from the original one.  For example, Gen. Sandy Forsyth, writing about the Beecher Island fight, said that his chief scout, Sharp Grover, upon seeing the Cheyenne massed on the high ground, said, "Oh, Heavens, General, look at all the Indians!"  Now, if you believe that a veteran of the CW (IIRC, Grover was a general in the CS army), and a veteran of the Western frontier would have used the word, "Heavens"...      But, that's what Forsyth wrote some fifty years later in a book intended for publication.  What Grover probably said was, "Oh, xxxx, General, look at alll those xxxxxxx Indians!" 

[Jake C]

IMO, Custer's best chance of victory lay in capturing non-combatants in order to compel the warriors to surrender, like he did a the Washita. Once he lost the element of surprise and the initiative, and found himself unable to get into Sioux camp, Custer was finished. All the Spencer would have done was prolonged the fight. Truthfully, I don't see where the Schofield would have made a difference at all.

[St8LineLeatherSmith]

The whole campaign was doomed from the beginning due to bad intelegence/recon and GAC arrogance
the types of firearms used in the battle would not made much of a diffrence for Custer and his troops due to they were out numbered 5  to one Cheyenne and Lacota/Sioux warriors to one I think it was with t large majority having repeating rifles.

[Buffalo Creek Law Dog]

Being retired Air Force, I have to say that Custer's biggest mistake was his failure to call in air support

[Trailrider]

Definitely could have used some A-10's and F-16's with cluster-f... uh, bombs! 

[shrapnel]

Spencers and Schofields weren't the answer to Custer's side of the battle. There are so many other circumstances involved with the battle that it takes volumes to explain it. Most people have little to no understanding of Indian warfare in the 19th century, military tactics and equipment. Be assured there were good reasons for the Colt and Trapdoor Springfield.

Once you actually set foot on the battlefields and the area on Reno Creek where the battle really started, you begin to understand more of what happened. The real beginning to the battle started at the site if the Lone Teepee above Reno Creek several miles from the Little Bighorn River. Indian scouts had told Custer about the large encampment on the river, their presence had already been discovered by the Indians.

When Custer reached the Lone Teepee, he had already sent Benteen on an reconnaissance mission to the South and West. Scouts had seen Indians in this area and Gerard had spotted around 40 Indians heading to the Bighorn from the site of the Lone Teepee, which was an area of a freshly abandoned campsite.

It was at this point, Custer sent Reno and his command after the Indians heading to the river and Custer was to head North and attack the encampment from the East, with the expectation of Benteen coming to his support.

Books have been written about how all of this happened and there is plenty of evidence to support the actions of the 7th Cavalry and the ability to surprise and subdue the Indians. Defeat is a different concept, this was a design that had worked many times to bring Indians into subjection by containing the non combatants made up of women and children.

With the women and children contained by the army, the rest of the tribes would submit. This had worked many times in Indian conflicts, but this wasn't to be. The Indians attacked Reno's command, something that had never been done before. By the time Custer had gotten far enough to engage the Indian encampment, Reno was being pushed up onto the bluffs and made ineffective as a fighting force. Benteen was still nowhere to be seen by Custer or Reno and Custer was in a real poor position with no back up.

Custer and his 210 or so troopers were killed and no amount of weaponry would have changed that. Gatling guns and howitzers were impossible to bring along and would have been worthless to try to engage a mobile force with the number of Indians and the way that they attacked Custer in that position.

There is so much more that there isn't room to post here, but suffice it to say, Custer could have made more use of radios than any other weaponry to have made a difference and survived the battle...

[Davem]

I just got back from a trip to the battlefield.  As was explained there, the plan was for Reno to attack and draw the warriors.  Custer would ride north through a ravine to the opposite end of the camp and capture the women and children trying to escape. At that point the warriors would give up rather than have the women and children killed.  I read Buffalo Bill's autobiography prior to the trip. Bill claims that the biggest problem was Crook's outfit had run into the Sioux earlier and claimed there were only 2,000 to 3,000 warriors.  I think Custer's scouts tried in vain to tell him they saw a lot more than that.
   Prior to the fight the army had spent a fair amount of time trying to figure out where the Sioux had gone.  It may have been that Custer was afraid the Sioux would slip away so he attacked. Logic would suggest to send scouts to tell the other troops you found the main camp and then wait.
   Even with the arms they had, Reno and his men stood off repeated attacks so if Custer had not split the forces he obviously would have survived right along with Reno.
   The issues will never be settled. If Reno didn't retreat to the higher ground it seems he would have been wiped out. At that particular moment the Sioux were unaware of Custer's location so if Reno had continued the attack Custer probably could have gotten un noticed to the north end but even so, they were so out numbered I can't see how the plan would have worked. As stated, the Sioux had better weapons as well.
   Well, I guess Custer had plenty of bravado but splitting up the forces and riding blind through a ravine that had not been scouted- it just seems you are asking for disaster.

[Trailrider]

I will agree wholeheartedly that the entire Big Horn & Yellowstone Expedition of 1876 needed communications between the three (or two after Gibbon and Terry joined up) commands to properly co-ordinate the expedition. As it was, following the Rosebud Battle on 17 June, Crook tried to send couriers to find Terry (Custer), but the country was "crawling with Sioux". Crook had twice the number of personnel, including troopers, packers and Montana miners who had joined his column. His command was attacked on Rosebud Creek, and he divided his command into three, which was tactical doctrine of the day.  One part, under William B. Royall, was sucked in by the Sioux and Cheyenne, by the usual Indian tactic of attacking, and when the troops charged, withdrew and waited for the cavalry to chase them. Whereupon they swarmed the strung out formations, inflicting heavy casualties on the horse soldiers.  Only the presence of infantry troops, standing on higher ground with their "Long Tom" Springfield rifles allowed the cavalry to disengage!  Meanwhile, Crook sent Capt. (Bvt. Col.) Anson Mills with his battalion down Rosebud Canyon to try to find an alleged Indian village. When Crook found his main line heavily pressed, he sent his adjutant after Mills, recalling the column. They defiled out of the only place in Rosebud Canyon where it was possible to do so, which brought the troops behind the Indians. As the battle had been raging for several hours, the Indians grew tired of it, and when they saw Mill's command, broke off.  Crook claimed he won the battle, as he held the ground (temporarily). Strategically, however, it was a defeat, as he retreated to Camp Cloud Peak at the confluence of Big & Little Goose Creeks (where Sheridan, WY, now stands), and waited for the 5th Cav and Buffalo Bill to join him.  Meanwhile, a week later, Custer arrived at LBH. Frankly, I doubt if repeating rifles would have helped Custer. The Indians were reported to have had more firearms than he had troops, and only about a third of the Indians had firearms of any kind!  Their most effective weapon was the bow and arrow, which could be fired in high trajectory, which pretty much negated any cove the troopers were able to find behind downed horses. Given the terrain the only thing that might have helped Custer would have been pack howitzers with cannister rounds. And it is likely they would have been overrun before they could have been unpacked and set up.
Firepower will only help you so far in the face of overwhelming odds. Just look at Lt. Grummon's situation in the Fetterman fight. His troops were armed with Spencers and had two civilian employees armed with Henry's. They lasted the longest of Fetterman's command...about 15 minutes according to the Indians! Forsyth's Scouts survived (mostly) at Beecher Island with Spencers mainly because they had a good defensive position. At that, they sustained pretyy heavy casualties.

[Davem]

Well hindsight is 20/20 but after seeing the actual battlefield I have to conclude that an attack wasn't warranted.  Custer would have been better off to find the best possible defensive position and keep the entire command together and try to induce an Indian attack. They could have held out and reduced a lot of the warriors.  Then wait for the other troops to arrive.  If Custer really did believe he was up against 2,000 to 3,000 warriors- it justifies his actions a little bit but he was foolhardy to rely that much on the reports, especially if his own scouts were telling him there were far greater numbers.
   On the firearms, I've always sort of favored this idea of a mixed bag.  Have the trapdoor Springfield for long range situations, maybe half the troops with that and then the other half with Spensers for faster shooting at closer ranges to stop an all out charge.
   On the same trip I stopped south of Sheridan to look at Fort Kearney.  I had read "Great Western Indian Fights" so I was familiar with the several fights but it was really great to see the actual lay of the land.  The Fetterman Massacre.  What really impressed me was that I was expecting to see all the graves right over the other side of the ridge, not about a mile farther on.  I got thinking on this.  When the cavalry first crossed the ridge they would be on guard for an ambush.  They may have slowed down a little.  After a few hundred yards they may have figured there was no ambush and the Indians they were chasing were getting away. Now they picked up the speed, throwing caution to the wind and about a mile farther down the ravine they ride right into the trap.  Really clever planning on the part of the Indians.

[Trailrider]

Part of the problem the Army had during the Indian Wars campaigns was the arrogance of many of the commanders who had waged successful fights against others with similar training during the Civil War, plus prejudice and lack of respect for what they considered were "primative savages".  Fetterman boasted that with 80 men he could ride through the whole Sioux nation. Ironically, that was the number of infantry and cavalry he had with him when he disobeyed orders NOT to follow the Indians across the ridge. There were exceptions, of course. Ranald McKenzie was a great tactician when it came to fighting Indians. Even Gen. Crook, a top logistician, who respected and eventually championed the cause of the Indians he had once fought, made a number of mistakes trying to subdue the Sioux after both the Rosebud and LBH battles, engaging in the "starvation march" that mainly succeded in wearing out his troops.

[Davem]

Yeah, I guess as time went on Sheridan and Crook didn't see eye to eye.  Buffalo Bill wrote that Crook traveled light without a lot of gear, like the rest of the men. "A real Indian Fighter" I think was how BB put it. 

[Good Troy]

Interesting discussion gentlemen!  It is encouraging me to read more!
I've recently read "The Heart of Everything That Is", which is a story about Red Cloud and "his" war.  Currently, I'm reading "The Killing of Crazy Horse".  The recent read spends a lot of time following Crook and his expeditions.  Next read will likely be something on LBH, or Custer. 

[Davem]

There seemed to be a practice at the time of not delaying an attack.. Kit Carson was upset that on one occasion they were pursuing a band of hostiles and when they caught up Carson wanted to immediately charge before the hostiles knew what hit them.  His commander waited and a woman hostage was killed and the hostiles got away. In any event this "Charge Now and think about it later" attitude was maybe ingrained into some of the Indian Fighters. Obviously it only works when the numbers of hostiles are manageable.
The Indians themselves had become a different foe.  I think they finally realized that they had to adopt new tactics involving organized maneuvers.  If you read about the Vikings or the Ancient Greeks at Troy, warfare in some instances was not much more than a huge amount of duels going on at the same time between the different combatants.  Maybe the U.S. Army failed to realize that they were beginning to face a more organized enemy.
Probably the only real option would have been to immediately send scouts to the other U.S. Forces and take up a good defensive position and wait for more troopers to arrive.  The problem is, the Indians could then slip away and if you followed you then made yourself open to attack on less favorable ground.
I myself am just starting to really read up on this subject.  What exactly were the Sioux trying to do? Get to Canada?